Discretion in Capital Sentencing Instructions: Guided or Misguided? by Luginbuhl, James & Howe, Julie
Indiana Law Journal
Volume 70 | Issue 4 Article 5
Fall 1995
Discretion in Capital Sentencing Instructions:
Guided or Misguided?
James Luginbuhl
North Carolina State University
Julie Howe
North Carolina State University
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Courts Commons, and the Criminal Law Commons
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Law
School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized administrator of
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Luginbuhl, James and Howe, Julie (1995) "Discretion in Capital Sentencing Instructions: Guided or Misguided?," Indiana Law
Journal: Vol. 70: Iss. 4, Article 5.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol70/iss4/5
Discretion in Capital Sentencing Instructions:
Guided or Misguided?
JAMES LUGINBUHL*
JULIE HowE**
INTRODUCTION
The role of the jury in a criminal trial is to determine the facts from the
evidence and then to apply the law to those facts. The applicable law is given
to the jurors through instructions from the judge prior to the jury's delibera-
tions. Judicial instructions, therefore, play a crucial role in the outcome of a
trial. Nowhere is this role more important than in the sentencing phase of a
capital trial, the point at which the jury has in its hands the ultimate moral
decision: whether a defendant will live or die. Capital sentencing instructions
also play a critical role in mitigating the unbridled juror discretion in capital
sentencing that was at issue in Furman v. Georgia.' In Furman, the United
States Supreme Court declared the death penalty unconstitutional because of
its potentially capricious application.2
The decision whether or not to take a life is intensely difficult for a jury,
and capital sentencing instructions presumably should aid the jury by
providing guidance:
[C]apital jurors are much more at the mercy of their instructions than jurors
in other kinds of cases. They depend upon these instructions to tell them
how to comprehend the decision before them, to focus them collectively on
what is important, guide them as a group about which theories to use,
which factors to take into account, and how to reach a consensus about this
uniquely personal and deeply moral decision?
Given the potentially dire consequences if capital sentencing instructions are
misunderstood by jurors, one would assume that considerable attention has
been devoted to framing these instructions in a way that jurors can under-
stand. Furthermore, one would assume that attempts have been made by the
legal system to determine whether jurors, in fact, do understand the capital
sentencing instructions to which they are exposed. The data to be reported
here, however, suggest that this is not the case.
Our data are derived from intensive interviews with eighty-three jurors who
served in capital trials in North Carolina between 1990 and 1994. The fifty-
two females and thirty-one males served in a total of twenty-six capital
murder trials. Seventy-nine of the eighty-three jurors served in eleven matched
* Associate Professor, Department of Psychology, North Carolina State University.
** Ph.D. Candidate in Psychology, North Carolina State University.
1. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
2. See id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("[T]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot
tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under legal systems that permit this unique penalty to be
so wantonly and so freakishly imposed.").
3. Craig Haney et al., Deciding to Take a Life: Capital Juries, Sentencing Instructions, and the
Jurisprudence of Death, J. Soc. IssuEs, Summer 1994, at 149, 155.
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pairs of capital trials in the same or adjoining counties, with one trial ending
in a life sentence verdict and the other in a death penalty verdict. Both males
and females were divided almost evenly between life and death cases: fifteen
males served on life juries and sixteen on death juries, while twenty-seven
females served on life juries and twenty-two on death juries.' We interviewed
three jurors from nine of the trials and four jurors frgm the other thirteen
trials.
The interviews were conducted under the auspices of the Capital Jury
Project, a multi-state project funded by the National Science Foundation
which was aimed at gaining a greater understanding of the capital jury
experience.' The interviewers used a standard interview form of approxi-
mately fifty pages, and, on average, the interview lasted more than three and
one-half hours. The interviews delved into all facets of the juror's experience
in his or her capital trial.
I. CAPITAL SENTENCING CONCEPTS
Death penalty states employ a bifurcated trial which splits the trial process
into two distinct phases. Jurors first hear evidence regarding guilt or
innocence and render a verdict. If the defendant is found guilty of capital
murder, the trial moves to the second stage in which the jurors hear evidence
regarding aggravating and mitigating factors and then decide on the penalty.
The Capital Jury Project interviews explored the jurors' experiences during
both stages of the trial. This Article, however, focuses only on the jurors'
comprehension of the judicial instructions given to them in the second (or
penalty) stage-the stage at which the jurors decide on life or death for the
defendant. In North Carolina, the jury's decision at stage two of the trial is
binding on the judge,7 another factor which adds to the importance of jurors
understanding the law (as conveyed by the instructions) governing their life
or death decision.
During the penalty phase of a capital trial, North Carolina juries must make
a series of decisions before arriving at the final verdict of life or death. These
decisions include (a) whether aggravating factors (facts about the crime or the
defendant that argue for death) exist; (b) whether mitigating factors (facts
about the crime or the defendant that argue for life) exist; (c) whether the
mitigating factors are insufficient to outweigh the aggravating factors; and
(d) whether the aggravating factors, taking into account any mitigating factors,
4. The four remaining jurors served in four different trials. The interview process for these four
trials was initiated but was discontinued for various reasons. Coincidentally, all four of the trials ended
with a death penalty verdict, and all four jurors were women.
5. The overall project is under the direction of William Bowers of Northeastern University.
6. The United States Supreme Court established the bifurcated trial process in 'Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153 (1976).
7. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(b) (1994). While the jury's verdict is labeled in the statute
as merely a "sentence recommendation," the North Carolina Supreme Court has held that a trial court
does not have the power to overturn a death sentence recommended by a unanimous jury. Smith v.
State, 292 S.E.2d 264 (N.C. 1982)
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are sufficiently substantial to call for the death penalty.' The instructions
regarding these decisions are read by the judge from the pattern instructions
at the conclusion of the penalty phase evidence.9 Although jurors may have
been exposed to some aspects of the sentencing instructions during voir dire,
the conclusion of the penalty phase is the only time at which jurors will hear
the instructions in their entirety.
The capital sentencing instructions define various terms and describe
concepts and procedures that the jurors are expected to employ in their
deliberations. There are three particularly crucial concepts related to
aggravating and mitigating factors: (a) the domain from which aggravating
and mitigating factors may be selected; (b) the burden of proof required to
prove the existence of aggravating and mitigating factors; and (c) whether or
not unanimity is required to establish the existence of aggravating and
mitigating factors. It is imperative that jurors understand these concepts if
they are to render a legally correct decision as to life or death.
A. The Domain from Which Aggravating and Mitigating
Factors May Be Selected
The North Carolina General Assembly has established (as have most
legislatures in states with the death penalty)'0 a list of statutory aggravating
factors." The prosecution can only present evidence of these statutory
aggravating factors, and the jury can consider only those factors (if presented
by the prosecution) as potential aggravators. 2 The jury is prohibited from
considering other facts or evidence in aggravation.
By virtue of the Federal Constitution, however, the defense is not limited
in what it can present in mitigation, nor are the jurors limited as to what they
may consider in mitigation. 3 All evidence introduced at trial can be
considered in mitigation if a juror so chooses, provided the trial judge
determines that the evidence is relevant, and therefore admissible.
The consequences of jurors failing to understand these distinctions are
grave. For example, the failure of the jurors to understand that they may
consider any factors they desire in mitigation, not just those specifically
enumerated by the judge, could limit the weight given to mitigating evidence.
Conversely, if a significant number of jurors believe that they are allowed to
8. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(b)-(c).
9. These instructions are located at N.C.P.I.-CRIM. § 150.10 (1993).
10. E.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-5-49 (1994); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-703 (1994); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 5-4-604 (Michie 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-11-103 (West 1994); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 921.141 (West 1985 & Supp. 1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30 (1990); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-
101 (1994); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3 (West 1994); S.D. CODIFIED LAWs ANN. § 23A-27A-1 (1994);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202 (1994).
11. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(e).
12. Id.
13. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (holding that "the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments require that the sentencer... not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor,
any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the
defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death") (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
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consider any evidence of aggravation introduced at trial, the range of factors
they may use to justify a death sentence would be broadened. Expanding the
range of acceptable aggravating factors, while simultaneously narrowing the
range of acceptable mitigating factors, would appear to increase the odds of
the jury imposing the death penalty rather, than a life sentence.
B. Burden of Proof for Aggravating and Mitigating Factors
The prosecution must prove aggravating factors beyond a reasonable
doubt.14 The defense, however, must prove mitigating factors only to the
juror's satisfaction. 5 The defense is thus held to a less stringent standard of
proof for establishing the existence of mitigating factors than is the prosecu-
tion for establishing the existence of aggravating factors. In other words, the
law makes it easier to prove mitigation than to prove aggravation.
This is an extremely important point which the judicial instructions must
make clear to the jurors. The jurors must understand that the defense, in
asking for mercy, is not required to prove as much as the prosecution, which
is seeking death. As discussed in Part I.C below, the fact that the prosecution
and the defense bear different burdens of proof is not a concept with which
jurors are familiar. If the instructions do not emphasize this difference, many
jurors are unlikely to recognize it.
Do jurors understand this distinction? Do they comprehend that the
definition of proof for mitigating factors is different than it is for aggravating
factors? If they do not-particularly if jurors are prone to believe that
mitigating factors, like aggravating factors, must be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt-then the defense will be held to an unconstitutionally high
standard of proof, making it less likely that jurors will find the existence of
at least some mitigating factors. If this sort of misunderstanding were to
occur, the jurors might unconstitutionally sentence the defendant to death.
C. Unanimity Requirements for Aggravating and Mitigating Factors
Jurors must be unanimous in their finding of any aggravating factor.6 The
unanimity requirement does not apply to mitigating factors, however. In
McKoy v. North Carolina,7 and Mills v. Maryland," the Supreme Court
held that mitigating factors do not require unanimity-any juror who believes
that a mitigating factor exists may consider that factor in his or her final
decision on life or death. This is another way in which the law makes it easier
14. See id. at 604 n.12 ("Nothing in this opinion limits the traditional authority of a court to
exclude, as irrelevant, evidence not bearing on the defendant's character, prior record, or the
circumstances of his offense.").
15. N.C.P.I.-CRIM. § 150.10, at 27; see infra text accompanying note 22.
16. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000; State v. Kirkley, 302 S.E.2d 144, 157 (1983) (holding that
the "jury must unanimously find that an aggravating circumstance exists before that circumstance may
be considered by the jury in determining its sentence recommendation").
17. 494 U.S. 433 (1990).
18. 486 U.S. 367 (1988).
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for the defense to prove mitigation than it does for the state to prove
aggravation.
As with the issues discussed previously, it is necessary to determine
whether or not the instructions convey this crucial difference in the unanimity
requirements, and what consequences might follow if they do not. If, for
example, jurors believe that they must be unanimous in the decision about any
specific mitigating factor, individual jurors may very well fail to consider
mitigating factors that they would have considered had they been aware that
unanimity was not required. Such a misunderstanding would be in direct
violation of Mills and McKoy and, again, would seem to increase the
likelihood of a death sentence.
II. FINDINGS
The issues raised above were explored during interviews in which the
former capital jurors were asked a total of six questions. Three of the
questions related to aggravating factors and three related to mitigating factors.
The questions, along with the percentage and number of jurors giving each
response, are presented in Table 1.
TABLE 1
JUROR RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ON AGGRAVATING
AND MITIGATING FACTORS
Aggravating Factors Percent Number
1. Among factors in favor of a death sentence,
could the jury consider:
a. any aggravating factor that made the
crime worse 48% 40
b. only a specific list of aggravating
factors mentioned by the judge 36%** 30
C. don't know/no answer 16% 13
2. For a factor in favor of a death sentence to
be considered, did it have to be:
a. proved beyond a reasonable doubt 68%** 56
b. proved by a preponderance of the
evidence 14% 12
c. proved only to a juror's personal satis-
faction 12% 10
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(Table 1, continued)
d. don't know/no answer 6% 5
3. For a factor in favor of a death sentence to
be considered, did:
a. all jurors have to agree on that factor 76%** 63
b. jurors not have to agree unanimously
on that factor 22% 18
c. don't know/no answer 2% 2
Mitigating Factors Percent Number
4. Among factors in favor of a life sentence,
could the jury consider:
a. any mitigating factor that made the
crime not as bad 59%** 49
b. only a specific list of mitigating fac-
tors mentioned by the judge 24% 20
c. don't know/no answer 17% 14
5. For a factor in favor of a life sentence to be
considered, did it have to be:
a. proved beyond a reasonable doubt 41% 34
b. proved by a preponderance of the
evidence 23%** 19
c. proved only to a juror's personal satis-
faction 24%** 20
d. don't know/no answer 12% 10
6. For a factor in favor of a life sentence to be
considered, did:
a. all jurors have to agree on that factor 42% 35
b. jurors not have to agree unanimously
on that factor 47%** 39
c. don't know/no answer 11% 9
Note: Starred (**) responses are legally correct.
Responses to the first three questions showed
comprehension regarding the standards relating
a considerable lack of
to aggravating factors.
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Roughly one-half (48%) of the jurors incorrectly believed that they could
consider as an aggravating factor any factor that made the crime worse. Only
about one-third (36%) of the jurors correctly understood that they were
restricted to the specific list of aggravating factors mentioned by the judge.
Jurors showed higher levels of comprehension on Question 2 (burden of
proof) and Question 3 (unanimity), with two-thirds (68%) correctly being
aware that an aggravating factor had to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt
and three-fourths (76%) of the jurors understanding that unanimity was
required to find the existence of an aggravating factor. Nevertheless, one-half
(48%) of the jurors incorrectly believed that they could have considered non-
enumerated aggravating circumstances, one-fourth (26%) incorrectly believed
that aggravating factors needed only to be proven by a preponderance of the
evidence or to the satisfaction of the juror, while only a comparatively small
percentage (22%) incorrectly believed that unanimity was not required.
Overall, juror comprehension appears to be worse when mitigating factors
are considered. Well over one-half (59%) of the jurors were aware that they
could consider any evidence they desired as a mitigating factor. However,
jurors' understanding with regard to the issues of burden of proof and
unanimity was poor. Slightly under one-half (47%) of the jurors correctly
understood that mitigating factors did not require proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, while almost as many (41%) incorrectly thought that the standard of
proof for mitigating factors was proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Similarly,
less than one-half (47%) of the jurors were aware that unanimity was not
required to find the existence of mitigating factors, while a similar percentage
(42%) incorrectly believed that unanimity was required.
If jurors are to correctly apply the law, an appreciation of the different
requirements regarding burden of proof and unanimity is crucial. Yet these
percentages demonstrate that very similar proportions of jurors gave correct
and incorrect responses to the questions regarding those two issues. It is
unknown how many jurors were simply guessing at the correct response.
These data reveal that jurors inadequately comprehend the domain from
which aggravating and mitigating factors could be considered, as well as both
the required burden of proof and the requirement (or lack thereof) of
unanimity. While jurors' understanding of the requirements regarding burden
of proof and unanimity for aggravating factors was fairly high, one-half
believed that they could apply these criteria to any aggravating factor that
they desired. Conversely, although slightly more than one-half of the jurors
correctly understood that they could consider anything in mitigation, fewer
than one-half correctly understood that the burden of proof was less than a
reasonable doubt or that unanimity was not required. This suggests that even
if a juror correctly believed that he or she could consider a particular factor
in mitigation, it is likely that the juror would fail to find the existence of that
mitigating factor due to a lack of understanding of the burden of proof.
In order to understand jurors' comprehension (or lack thereof), we recoded
the responses to the already-described six questions. A score of "1" represents
a correct answer and a score of "0" represents an incorrect answer, a "don't
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know," or a failure to respond. These new scores are summed over the six
questions to yield a total score, which can range from zero (the juror failed
to answer a single question correctly) to six (the juror answered all six
questions correctly). These results are presented in the top portion of Table 2.
TABLE 2
SUMMED ACCURACY SCORES
Aggravating and Mitigating Factors Combined
Score Frequency Percent
0 2 2%
1 4 5%
2 10 12%
3 31 37%
4 24 29%
5 9 11%
6 3 4%
Aggravating Factors Alone
Score Frequency Percent
0 8 10%
1 20 24%
2 36 43%
3 19 23%
Mitigating Factors Alone
Score Frequency Percent
0 16 19%
1 24 29%
2 26 31%
3 17 21%
Table 2 further illustrates that comprehension of these three vital principles
was poor. Only three jurors (4%) answered all six questions correctly, nine
jurors (11%) answered five questions correctly, and twenty-four jurors (29%)
answered four questions correctly. Thus, less than fifty percent of the jurors
could answer more than one-half of the questions correctly. These results
suggest that the lack of comprehension was not limited to a small subset of
jurors; confusion and misunderstanding was the rule rather than the exception.
Such results suggest that there is a reasonable likelihood that jurors misunder-
stood, or simply failed to understand, the instructions. 9
19. Where the claim is that an instruction is ambiguous and therefore subject to an erroneous
interpretation, the Supreme Court has stated that the proper inquiry is whether there is a reasonable
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Our research also calculated the degree of comprehension separately for the
three questions directed at aggravating factors and the three questions directed
at mitigating factors. These results are displayed in the bottom portion of
Table 2 and provide additional evidence that juror comprehension of all three
principles was poor. For example, thirty-four percent of the jurors correctly
answered none or only one of the questions concerning aggravation; this
figure increases to forty-eight percent when the questions concern mitigation.
Instructions must be considered inadequate when such a substantial percentage
of jurors fail to understand the law supposedly conveyed by the instructions.
Why is juror comprehension so poor? One reason may simply be the length
and generally boring nature of the instructions. In an experimental study
conducted in the early 1990's, jury-eligible citizens were exposed to a
videotaped reading of the North Carolina capital sentencing instructions (with
minor portions omitted).20 The tape lasted approximately twenty-five
minutes, and many subjects commented afterward that, due to the length and
complexity of the instructions, they found it difficult to follow them. Thus,
jurors may very well have difficulty remembering the instructions simply
because they are long and boring.
Capital instructions also typically use complex language, unfamiliar words,
one-sentence definitions of terms, and many sentences with multiple
negatives. Linguistic analyses of the Illinois capital sentencing instructions
uncovered serious problems regarding syntax, semantics, general organization,
and a lack of information necessary to arrive at a decision.2 ' Indeed, many
of our jurors noted that the instructions were difficult to understand and that
jurors frequently desired clarification. When asked, "What do you remember
most about the, judge's instructions?", several jurors noted that they were
lengthy and hard to remember. Jurors noted that when they asked for
clarification, the judge "simply reread the instructions," and one exasperated
juror reported that the judge "reread the entire instructions, not just what we
wanted to know." Other comments on the instructions included: "[T]hey are
full of legal talk," and "[they are] very long and complicated, hard to retain
and interpret as fast as he was reading it." Thus, objective assessments reveal
that instructions are complex and full of unusual terminology, and the
subjective experience of the jurors serves as confirmation.
A second potential reason for poor comprehension is that the instructions
do not alert jurors to concepts that are novel or unfamiliar. Therefore, jurors
tend to fall back on their own prior knowledge. In the interview questions,
jurors were most accurate on the questions regarding the burden of proof and
the requirement of unanimity for proving aggravating factors. This is not
surprising, since proof beyond a reasonable doubt and jury unanimity are
familiar concepts to most jurors. Jurors fared the worst, however, in applying
likelihood that the jury has misapplied the challenged instruction, thereby resulting in prejudice to the
defendant. See Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380-81 & n.4 (1990).
20. James Luginbuhl, Comprehension of Judges' Instructions in the Penalty Phase of a Capital
Trial: Focus on Mitigating Circumstances, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 203 (1992).
21. Judith N. Levi, Evaluating Jury Comprehension of Illinois Capital-Sentencing Instructions, AM.
SPEECH, Spring 1993, at 20.
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these same concepts to mitigating factors, tending to believe that mitigating
factors were subject to the same criteria of proof as aggravating factors.
The rules for burden of proof and juror unanimity as they apply to
mitigation are not consistent with jurors' expectations, and the instructions in
no way alert the jurors that these rules are in any way special or something
of which they should take note. The instructions read:
The existence of any mitigating circumstance must be established by a
preponderance of the evidence, that is, the evidence, taken as a whole must
satisfy you-not beyond a reasonable doubt, but simply satisfy you-that
any mitigating circumstance exists. If the evidence satisfies any of you that
a mitigating circumstance exists, you would indicate that finding on the
"Issues and Recommendation" form. A juror may find that any mitigating
circumstance exists by a preponderance of the evidence whether or not that
circumstance was found to exist by all the jurors.22
While this provisions does state the law in a way that most jurors probably
would understand, it occurs in a single paragraph, two-thirds of the way
through the instructions. The difference in burden of proof and unanimity for
mitigating factors is not emphasized. The instructions fail to point out to
jurors that the criteria for mitigating factors differs from those for aggravating
factors. It is not pointed out to jurors that mitigation does not have to be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. It is not emphasized that unanimity is not
required to find the existence of mitigation. It is not made clear that a single
juror can find that a mitigator exists and can consider that factor in his or her
final decision. There is, thus, no hint that the concepts and rules described in
this paragraph of the instructions are any more important than those described
elsewhere. Yet these concepts are, in fact, crucial for the jurors to understand
if they are to correctly apply the law.23
In addition, the manner in which aggravating and mitigating factors are
handled on the "Issues and Recommendation" form-which the jurors have
in front of them while they deliberate-virtually ensures that the different
standards of proof will not be recognized by the jurors. Jurors first must
answer Issue One, which reads: "Do you unanimously find from the evidence
beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of one or more of the following
aggravating circumstances?"24 Next, the jurors answer Issue Two, which
reads: "Do you find from the evidence the existence of one or more of the
following mitigating circumstances?"25
Note that the words "beyond a reasonable doubt" and "unanimously" are
simply omitted for mitigating factors. No attempt is made to alert jurors that
the criteria for mitigating factors differ from those for aggravating factors. Is
it any wonder that jurors have a poor grasp of the differences in the standards
used to determine the existence of aggravating and mitigating factors?
22. N.C.P.I.-CRIM. § 150.10, at 27.
23. The North Carolina pattern instructions, including the "Issues and Recommendation" form, were
revised in 1993, and the revision helps reduce this deficiency. See id. § 150.10.
24. Id. § 150.10 app.
25. Id.
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Jurors come to the courtroom with certain expectations, or schemata, about
what their role will be.26 If they in fact will be required to act in ways that
do not conform to their expectations, this should be emphasized in the
instructions. Abundant research in the domain of social psychology attests to
the power of expectations.2 In addition, recent research indicates that
individuals possess naive representations (schemata) of crimes that frequently
are not in accordance with the legal definition of that crime, and which are
not counteracted by ordinary jury instructions." Such schemata are counter-
acted only by directly attacking specific inaccurate features of these schemata
with the correct legal information29-- something that capital sentencing
instructions routinely fail to do.30
Note also that not only are the standards for proving mitigating factors
different from those used for proving aggravating factors, but they also differ
from the standards used during the guilt/innocence phase of.the trial. That is,
the jury has arrived at the penalty phase precisely because they have
employed the criteria of reasonable doubt and unanimity in finding the
defendant guilty of capital murder. Thus, these concepts are firmly embedded
in the jurors' minds, and are not easily dislodged.
Jurors responded to another pair of questions designed to evaluate their
comprehension of the sentencing instructions. One question asked whether
certain sets of circumstances would require a sentence of death, while the
other question asked whether certain sets of circumstances would require a
sentence of life imprisonment. When the issue conceined death, jurors were
given five different sets of circumstances (e.g., "one or more factors favoring
a death sentence," or "stronger factors favoring than opposing a death
sentence"). After each set of circumstances was posed, jurors were asked
whether the jury was required to impose a death sentence, or whether it was
free to choose between death and life imprisonment. When the issue
concerned life, jurors were asked whether the jury was required to impose a
life sentence or free to choose between death and life, under five different
sets of circumstances (e.g., "one or more factors opposing a death sentence,"
or "stronger factors opposing than favoring a death sentence"). These
questions, along with jurors' responses, are presented in Table 3.
26. See generally Luginbuhl, supra note 20; Vicki L. Smith, When Prior Knowledge and Law
Collide: Helping Jurors Use the Law, 17 LAW AND HUM. BEHAV. 507 (1992).
27, See, e.g., SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION (1991).
28. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 26.
29. Smith, supra note 26, at 533.
30. It is reasonable to ask whether jurors' comprehension was related to their educational level.
Jurors were asked the extent of their education in the interview, and their responses were coded into one
of six categories: (1) did not finish high school; (2) finished high school; (3) some technical training
beyond high school; (4) some college but did not graduate; (5) graduated from college; and (6) attended
graduate or professional school. Analyses revealed no statistically significant relationship between a
juror's level of education and any of the indices of comprehension.
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TABLE 3
UNDERSTANDING OF MANDATORY DEATH AND LIFE SENTENCES
Question
1. To the best of your memory, was the
jury required to impose a death sentence, Death
or free to choose between death and life, Required Choose DN/NA
if it found:
a. one or more factors
favoring a death sentence 11% 80% 10%
b. one or more factors
favoring a death sentence
and none opposing it 25% 59% 16%
c. more factors favoring than
opposing a death sentence 23% 69% 8%
d. stronger factors favoring
than opposing a death
sentence 27% 60% 13%
e. an equal balance between
factors favoring and
opposing a death sentence 2% 83% 14%
2. To the best of your memory, was the
jury required to impose a sentence of life Life
imprisonment, or free to choose between Required Choose DN/NA
death and life, if it found:
a. one or more factors
opposing a death sentence 11% 72% 17%
b. one or more factors
opposing a death sentence
and none favoring it 36% 48% 16%
c. more factors opposing than
favoring a death sentence 30% 54% 16%
d. stronger factors opposing
than favoring a death
sentence 34% 48% 18%
e. an equal balance between
factors favoring and
opposing a death sentence 17% 66% 17%
1172 [Vol. 70:1161
1995] DISCRETION IN CAPITAL SENTENCING INSTRUCTIONS
In North Carolina, the final penalty issue the jurors must decide (assuming
that they have found the existence of one or more aggravating factors which
are not outweighed by the mitigating factors), is whether the aggravating
factors are strong enough, when considered together with any mitigating
factors, to call for the death penalty.3 ' As can be seen in Table 3, none of
the five options for the first question embodied that concept; instead the
questions focus on the number or strength of factors for or against the death
penalty. Thus, in none of the five examples would the jury be required to
impose a death sentence. It is always within the jury's power to decide
whether life or death is the appropriate sentence.32 Under three of the five
scenarios presented, however, approximately one-fourth of the jurors believed
that the death penalty was required.
Jurors appear to be influenced by whether the aggravating factors are
stronger or more numerous than the mitigating factors. When aggravators and
mitigators are equally balanced (Option e), almost none of the jurors believed
that death was required. When mitigators are not mentioned (Option a), there
is still a relatively low error rate. But when mitigators are specifically
mentioned and are described as somehow weaker than aggravators (Options
b, c, and d), a substantial minority of the jurors believed that the jury was
required to impose death.
The comparable question and responses regarding a mandatory sentence of
life are displayed in the bottom half of Table 3. There are certain conditions
where a North Carolina jury would be required to impose a sentence of life.
If there are no factors favoring death, that is, the jury has not found the
existence of any aggravating factors (Option b), the jury is bound by law to
impose a sentence of life imprisonment.33 In addition, if the mitigating
factors outweigh the aggravating factors (Option d), the jury would also be
required to impose a life sentence.34 Yet only one-third of the jurors
understood that life was mandatory under each of those conditions.
In sum, it is disturbing that roughly one-fourth of the jurors felt that death
was mandatory when it was not and approximately one-half of the jurors
failed to appreciate those situations which mandated life. An incorrect
response rate of one-fourth may not seem disproportionate, but that translates
into three out of the twelve jurors who feel that death is mandated.
These hypothetical situations might have led to some confusion. However,
at an earlier point in the interview, some very straight-forward questions were
asked which further reveal jurors' poor understanding of the law. In
questioning jurors about the penalty phase, they were asked whether, after
hearing all the evidence at the penalty phase, they believed it proved that
(a) the defendant's conduct was "heinous, atrocious, or cruel"; and (b) the
defendant would be "dangerous in the future." A high percentage responded
31. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(b), (c).
32. This varies by state. In Tennessee, for example, the death penalty is mandated if the aggravating
factors outweigh the mitigating factors. T.P.I.-CRIM. § 7.04, at 69 (1992).
33. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(b), (c).
34. Id.
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positively to both questions: eighty-nine percent believed that evidence proved
that the defendant's conduct was heinous, atrocious, or cruel, while seventy
percent believed the evidence proved that the defendant would be dangerous
in the future.
Jurors were next asked whether, after hearing the judge's sentencing
instructions, they believed that the law required them to impose a death
sentence if (a) the defendant's conduct was heinous, atrocious, or cruel; or
(b) the defendant would be dangerous in the future. Here is where poor
understanding of the law is evident. Sixty-three percent of the jurors
incorrectly believed that the law required them to impose a death sentence if
the evidence proved that the defendant's conduct was heinous, atrocious, or
cruel. If one considers only those jurors who actually believed that the
defendant's conduct was heinous, atrocious, or cruel, this figure increases to
sixty-eight percent. A smaller percentage, forty-three percent, incorrectly
believed that the law required them to impose a death sentence if the evidence
proved that the defendant would be dangerous in the future. This percentage
increases to fifty-three percent when one considers only those jurors who
actually thought that the defendant would be dangerous in the future.
Note that these questions-whether the crime was heinous, atrocious, or
cruel, and whether the defendant would be dangerous in the future-had
emotional content that related directly to the evidence recently heard by the
jurors. When jurors were thinking graphically about their own trial, a large
number of them thought that death was mandatory. This is potent evidence
that our North Carolina jurors did not understand the law.
If the law, when properly understood, specifies certain conditions under
which either death or life is the appropriate punishment, then the instructions
should convey that law to the jurors in a way that they can readily compre-
hend. For example, consider the issue of whether certain conditions mandate
a sentence of death. Perhaps it is difficult for jurors to distinguish between the
concepts of death being required if aggravating factors are stronger than
mitigating factors, versus death being required only if aggravating factors,
considered along with mitigating factors, are sufficient to call for death.
In everyday life, a common decision strategy is to weigh the pros and cons
on a particular issue and then to go with the greater weight of the evidence.
It would therefore be understandable if a jury returned a verdict of death
when it determined that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating
factors. This is not, however, the criterion in North Carolina. If jurors find the
existence, of aggravating and mitigating factors, their next task is to decide
whether the mitigating factors are insufficient to outweigh the aggravating
factors.35 The instructions on this point read as follows:
You should not merely add up the number of aggravating circumstances
and mitigating circumstances. Rather, you must decide from all the
evidence what value to give to each circumstance, and then weigh the
35. N.C.P.I.-CRIM. § 150.10, at 42, app. (1993).
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aggravating circumstances, so valued, against the mitigating circumstances,
so valued, and finally determine whether the mitigating circumstances are
insufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstances."
Parenthetically, note the awkwardness of what the jurors are instructed to
do. Jurors are asked to determine if the mitigating factors are insufficient to
outweigh the aggravating factors. If the answer is "No," then the defendant
is sentenced to life. Thus, in order to sentence a defendant to life, the jury
must answer a negative question with a negative answer. The jury must not
find that the mitigating factors are insufficient to outweigh the aggravating
factors, which in plain English translates into "mitigating factors outweigh
aggravating factors." The instructions would be clearer if the words "are
insufficient to" were simply omitted from the final sentence in the preceding
paragraph, which would then conclude with, "finally determine whether the
mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances."
If jurors decide that the mitigating factors do not outweigh the aggravating
factors, they must then decide whether the defendant deserves the death
penalty. Issue Four of the "Issues and Recommendation" form, which the
judge gives to the jury to fill out, asks:
Do you unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating
circumstance or circumstances you found is, or are, sufficiently substantial
to call for the imposition of the death penalty when considered with the
mitigating circumstance -or circumstances found by one or more of you?37
If these instructions are carefully attended to and understood, the law is clear.
Jurors must decide whether mitigation outweighs aggravation. If mitigation
does not outweigh aggravation, they still must determine whether the
aggravation, taken together with the mitigation, is severe enough to warrant
the death penalty.
Thus, even if the total aggravation is stronger than the total mitigation
(irrespective of the number of aggravating and mitigating factors found),
jurors must still decide whether the totality of factors merits the death penalty.
In theory these are stringent criteria and, if followed scrupulously, would
restrict the use of the death penalty to only those most aggravated cases of
first-degree murder. In practice, however, roughly one-fourth of the jurors fail
to understand the law as conveyed by the instructions.
36. Id. § 150.10, at 42-43.
37. Id. § 150.10 app.
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TABLE 4
CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE TO UNDERSTAND CAPITAL
SENTENCING INSTRUCTIONS
Interpretation of
Principle Misunderstanding Consequences
Non-enumerated • Will consider Death more likely
Factors inappropriate
aggravators, thereby
broadening range of
aggravators.
- Will not consider Death more likely
appropriate mitigators,
thereby narrowing range
of mitigators.
Burden of Proof * Will not require proof Death more likely
beyond a reasonable
doubt for aggravators,
thereby making it easier
to prove aggravation.
* Will require proof Death more likely
beyond a reasonable
doubt for mitigators,
thereby making it harder
to prove mitigation.
Unanimity * Will not require Death more likely
unanimity for
aggravators, thereby
making it easier to prove
aggravation.
- Will require unanimity Death more likely
for mitigators, thereby
making it harder to prove
mitigation.
We believe the instructional ambiguity we have documented increases the
likelihood of the jury returning a verdict of death. Table 4 presents a summary
of the consequences if jurors misunderstand the instructions. It appears that
in all cases, an incorrect interpretation of the instructions tilts the jurors
toward a verdict of death. For example, if jurors believe that factors other
than those listed by the judge can be considered in aggravation, the list of
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potential aggravating factors is expanded, thereby increasing the likelihood of
a death verdict. In a complementary fashion, if the jury believes that only
those factors listed by the judge can be considered in mitigation, the list of
potential mitigators is limited, again increasing the likelihood of a death
verdict.
Continuing down the table, by believing that aggravating factors do not have
to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the jurors increase the likelihood of
some aggravating factors being found, and thus make a verdict of death more
likely. Conversely, if the jurors believe that mitigating factors do have to be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, they decrease the likelihood of some
mitigators being found and make a verdict of death more likely. Finally, a
belief that aggravating factors do not have to be found unanimously will
increase the likelihood of some aggravators being found, thereby again
moving the jury toward a verdict of death. Similarly, if jurors believe that
mitigating factors must be found unanimously, the jury is likely to find fewer
mitigators, again increasing the likelihood of a death verdict.
The consequences of instructional misunderstanding are particularly
significant because it is apparent that even before hearing the instructions, the
jury is predisposed toward a verdict of death. There are many reasons for this
predisposition. For example, evidence collected by other researchers shows
that death is likely to be seen as the appropriate punishment by jurors in
capital cases-a phenomenon which has sometimes been called a "presump-
tion of death. 38 One of the factors contributing to this presumption is the
belief by a majority of jurors that not only will the defendant be dangerous
in the future, but that he is also likely to be paroled after only a few years.39
Our data also suggest that jurors view death as a more likely punishment
than life. For example, as indicated earlier, large numbers of jurors thought
that death was mandatory if the evidence proved that the murder was heinous,
atrocious, or cruel, and nine out of ten jurors thought that this was exactly
what had to be proven by the evidence. Most of the jurors have thus
concluded that an aggravating circumstance exists, even before deliberations
have begun.
It is also true that the death-qualification process of selecting capital juries
(that is, asking jurors whether they would be willing to vote for the death
penalty, and rejecting those who indicate they would not) results in a jury
consisting of death penalty supporters. Those who could never vote for death
are excluded from serving,40 as are those who indicate that their ability to
follow the law would be impaired by their opposition to the death penalty.4'
A number of studies have strongly suggested that the resulting jury tends to
38. Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Deadly Confusion: Juror Instructions in Capital Cases,
79 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 12 (1993); William S. Geimer & Jonathan Amsterdam, Why Jurors Vote Life
or Death: Operative Factors in Ten Florida Death Penalty Cases, 15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 41-46 (1988).
39. Eisenberg & Wells, supra note 38, at 7-8.
40. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 516-18 (1968).
41. See Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985).
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be more conviction-prone than a non-death-qualified jury.42 Furthermore, it
has been shown that the process of death-qualification itself increases the
likelihood, in the jurors' view, that the defendant will receive the death
penalty.4 3 Additional data suggest that jurors who support the death penalty
are more receptive to aggravating factors and less receptive to mitigating
factors than are jurors who oppose the death penalty."
The jurors we interviewed who had sentenced a defendant to death had a
strong belief that defendants who have murdered and are not sentenced to
death spend a relatively short time in prison. Jurors were asked: "How long
did you think someone not given the death penalty for a capital murder in this
state usually spends in prison?" We divided the jurors into those who
indicated less than twenty years, those who indicated between twenty and
thirty years, and those who indicated more than thirty years. The results can
be seen in Table 5.
TABLE 5
ESTIMATE OF YEARS SERVED IN PRISON
Sentence Less than 20 20-30 More than 30
74% 12% 14%
Death (N = 32) (N = 5) (N = 6)
28% 67% 5%
Life (N = 11) (N = 27) (N = 2)
Note: The percentages refer to the percent for that row, not for the entire
group.
Of those jurors who sentenced a defendant to death, three-fourths believed
that a convicted murderer who was not sentenced to death would spend less
than twenty years in prison, while only one-fourth of the jurors who had
imposed a life sentence held similar beliefs. Instead, two-thirds of the jurors
who sentenced a defendant to life believed that defendants who committed
murder and who were not sentenced to death would spend from twenty to
thirty years in prison, while only a small percentage (12%) of those on the
death juries believed a defendant would serve that long. These huge
differences reflect real concerns of jurors who sentence defendants to death.
Jurors were also asked: "When you were considering the punishment, were
you concerned that [the defendant] might get back into society someday, if
42. See Claudia L. Cowan et al., The Effects of Death Qualification on Jurors' Predisposition to
Convict and on the Quality of Deliberation, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 53, 73-74 (1984).
43. See Craig Haney, On the Selection of Capital Juries: The Biasing Effects of the Death-
Qualification Process, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 121, 128-29 (1984).
44. See James Luginbuhl & Kathi Middendorf, Death Penalty Beliefs and Jurors' Responses to
Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances in Capital Trials, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 263, 275-76
(1988); see also Craig Haney et al., "Modern " Death Qualification: New Data on Its Biasing Effects,
18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 619, 630-31 (1994).
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not given the death penalty?" Their response options were, "yes, greatly
concerned," "yes, somewhat concerned," "yes, but only slightly concerned,"
and "no, not at all concerned." We collapsed the four response categories into
two, which we labeled "Concerned" and "Not Concerned," and evaluated how
concerned those who had sentenced to life and those who had sentenced to
death were about the possibility that the defendant might return to society.
The results are shown in Table 6.
TABLE 6
CONCERN WITH DEFENDANT RETURNING TO SOCIETY
Sentence Concerned Not Concerned
76% 24%
Death (N = 37) (N = 12)
41% 59%
Life (N = 7) (N = 10)
Note: The percentages refer to the percent for that row, not for the entire
group.
Three-fourths of the jurors who sentenced to death were concerned that the
defendant might return to society if not given a death sentence, while well
under one-half (41%) of the jurors who sentenced to life had similar concerns.
Thus, the belief that a defendant who was not sentenced to death would spend
relatively little time in prison and then be released back into society appears
to be a strong motivation for a juror's vote for death.
Another factor which would seem to tilt a capital jury toward death is the
difference in the content and nature between aggravating and mitigating
factors. Aggravating factors tend to be objective and factual. Typical
aggravating factors include (a) the defendant's prior conviction for a violent
crime; (b) the actions of the defendant which pose a threat to many people;
(c) the fact that the victim was a police officer, state patrol officer, official
of the court, etc.; (d) the murder being committed to avoid capture; and
(e) the murder being committed for pecuniary gain.4" If the prosecution
presents evidence on any of the aggravating factors, it is almost a foregone
conclusion that the jury will find them to exist.
Mitigating factors, on the other hand, are much more subjective; they are
judgment calls. Is the age of the defendant a mitigating factor or not? Was the
defendant's state of mind such that he could not conform his behavior to the
law? How minor was the defendant's role in the murder? What role, if any,
should a history of child abuse and neglect play?4 6
45. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(e).
46. One of the more subjective factors that is common to many states' statutes is whether the
murder was especially "heinous," "atrocious," or "cruel." See, e.g., id. § 15A-2000(e)(9). While this is
more subjective than most other aggravating factors, jurors view all murders as atrocious and, after
hearing testimony and frequently viewing disturbing pictures, are likely to see the murder about which
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This analysis of the difference between aggravating and mitigating factors
suggests that even though the burden of proof for aggravating factors is more
rigorous than it is for mitigating factors, aggravating factors may in fact be
easier to prove than mitigating factors. If aggravating factors are either true
or false on their face, then proving to the jury, beyond a reasonable doubt, the
existence of an aggravating factor (such as the defendant's having been
previously arrested for a violent crime) imposes no particular burden on the
prosecution. However, just "satisfying" jurors that a particular quality of the
crime or the defendant has mitigating value may be quite difficult for the
defense.
Many factors, therefore, point capital jurors in the direction of death.
Confusion about the law they are to apply in deciding between life or death
would appear to further bias the jury against the defendant. As Eisenberg and
Wells state:
[Our] data suggest that the sentencing phase of a capital trial commences
with a substantial bias in favor of death. This is not itself an indictment of
the death trial phase. But the tilt towards death suggests that a defendant
with a confused jury may receive a death sentence by default, without
having a chance to benefit from legal standards designed to give him a
chance for life.47
Thus, the capital sentencing instructions, which should provide an accurate
and detailed road map to the jury's final destination, appear instead to provide
many detours and roadblocks. With regard to mitigation, for example, jurors
must make a number of important decisions. They must decide what can be
considered in mitigation, what is the appropriate burden of proof, whether
they must agree unanimously, and in the end, whether the totality of the
evidence still merits the death penalty.
The data in Tables 1 and 3 show that (a) only three-fifths of the jurors are
likely to consider all the appropriate mitigating factors; (b) less than one-half
will require the appropriate burden of proof for mitigating factors; (c) less
than one-half will understand that unanimity is not required to find a
mitigating factor; and (d) only one-third will understand that a sentence of life
is required if the mitigating factors outweigh the aggravating factors. Even if
many jurors are predisposed to a verdict of life in a particular case, given the
exteni of their misunderstanding of the law, and the ample opportunity they
have to apply this misunderstanding at the various decision points, the
probability is high that the law will be misapplied at some point during this
decision process. Put another way, if the final penalty decision is death, there
is a high probability that this final penalty verdict is partially a product of the
faulty interpretation of the law.
For example, the jury may fail to consider a mitigating factor because it was
not one of those specifically enumerated by the judge. Or, if the jury does
consider that factor, the jurbrs may decide that it does not exist because it has
they are deliberating as being particularly so.
47. Eisenberg & Wells, supra note 38, at 12.
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not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Or, some jurors may find that the
mitigating factor exists while others do not, and the jurors therefore do not
further consider the factor because they cannot all agree that it exists.
An obvious implication of the data from our juror interviews is that revising
and improving the instructions should lead to increased comprehension of the
law by the jurors. This in turn should result in juror capital sentencing
decisions being influenced relatively more by the law and less by jurors' often
erroneous perception of the law. While we believe this to be the case, only a
portion of the arbitrariness that accompanies the decision on life or death
would be reduced by instructional improvement. William Bowers, for
example, reports that significant numbers of jurors have made up their minds
as to the penalty before the penalty phase of the trial has even begun.48 It is
also likely that an even higher number of jurors have made up their minds
after hearing the evidence in the penalty phase, but before beginning
deliberations. Thus, as long as we retain the death penalty, there are many
issues to address in the attempt to reduce the arbitrariness of its application.
CONCLUSION
The North Carolina capital sentencing instructions, on their face, appear to
set rather stringent criteria for the sentencing jury to apply before they may
impose the death penalty. Juror comprehension of the law as it is conveyed
by these instructions, however, is mediocre. The effect of the jurors' poor
understanding of the law is to reduce the likelihood that capital defendants
will benefit from the safeguards against arbitrariness built into the North
Carolina law.
Jurors have always had, and will continue to have, discretion in their capital
sentencing decision. At issue is the extent to which their discretion is guided
or misguided.
48. See William J. Bowers, The Capital Jury Project: Rationale, Design, and Preview of Early
Findings, 70 IND. LJ. 1043, 1093 tbl. 9 (1995).
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